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Notes
THERIEN, NIPISSING HOTEL - AND THEN WHAT?
GLYN K. EDWARDS, B.Sc.':*:
The issue raised in the Nipis&Ing Hotel' case is whether a trade
union is a suable entity in the eyes of the Ontario Courts. It must be
borne in mind that the Ontario Labour Relations Act2 does provide
certain proceedings and remedies against trade unions which are
taken before the Labour Relations Board, an arbitrator, or even a
magistrate if the Board allows a prosecution under s. 74. But these
proceedings have a very limited scope. They only cover offences
defined in the Act itself, and only provide relief for the parties directly
involved in the collective bargaining process, viz.: trade unions,
employers and employees. This note will focus on the broader aspects
of liability of trade unions in the courts of common law. Can a third
party sue a trade union in tort, in contract, or for a breach of the
Act? Can an employer sue a trade union; or can a trade union sue
an employer in a common law action in the ordinary courts?
The liability of a trade union is vitally important to a would-be
plaintiff because, if the trade union is not a suable entity then he is
left with three unsatisfactory alternatives. First, he can sue the
individual trade union officers or members who were responsible for
the alleged illegality. However, if substantial sums are involved, the
defendants will probably be judgment-proof. Secondly, under s. 75 of
the Judicature Act, the claimant can institute a class or representative
action against all the members of the trade union. In this way he
obtains judgment against the membership fund rather than against
the individual member. Theoretically, if he succeeds in the action he
should receive full compensation; but, in practice, the "Trust Fund"
concept makes it virtually impossible to succeed on a class action in
Ontario.3 Thirdly, a trade union may acquire legal status by estop-
pel.4 The gist of the doctrine is that having appeared to defend an
*Mr. Edwards a graduate of Bishop's University, is a third year student
at Osgoode Hall Law School.
I Kipissing Hotel Ltd. et al. v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees c Bar-
tenders International Union et al., [1963) O.R. 169.
2 The Labour Relations Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 202.
3 Before a representation order will be granted in a money claim, the
plaintiff must prove that the union has a trust fund which can be resorted
to in satisfaction of his claim. The doctrine was laid down in Barrett v.
Harris (1922), 69 D.L.R. 503 and Robinson v. Adams, [1925) 1 D.L.R. 359.
4 K'rug Furniture Company v. Berlin Union of Amalgamated Wood-
workers (1903), 5 O.L.R. 463.
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action in its own name the trade union is thereafter estopped from
denying that it is a suable entity. The idea that a rule of evidence,
estoppel, can actually create legal responsibility has been severely
criticized.5 Thus it is unlikely that Ontario courts would follow this
doctrine today. At any rate, an alert union may avoid this pitfall by
not appearing or defending in its own name.
An examination of the policy which underlies the law will aid in
understanding the purpose of the present legislation. The purpose of
most legislation has been to narrow trade-union liability, whereas the
general tendency of the courts is to widen grounds of liability. The
courts consider bodies possessing such power, wealth and influ-
ence ought to accept corresponding duties and responsibilities.
The leading case which first established that trade unions are suable
entities was the Taff Vale Case.6 Besides enunciating the above propo-
sition, Farwell, J., whose decision was subsequently affirmed by the
House of Lords, made his point very clear denying that by statute:
... the legislature had in fact legalized the existence of such irresponsible
bodies with such wide capacity for evil.7
In Hohfeldian terms, the courts are unwilling to accept the rights
and powers of trade unions without imposing the correlative duties and
liabilities. Therefore the courts find that the statutes, by inference,
create juridical entities. Reinforcing this is the fact that from a lay-
man's point of view* trade unions are naturally accepted as separate
entities.
In the infancy of trade unionism it made sense to protect unions
from legal actions because one sizeable judgment for damages would
have been disastrous to the labour movement. However, now it is
contended, that outside of the corporate giants, few business enter-
prises can match unions the size of the United Steel Workers of
America or the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, for wealth
and influence. They can afford to pay for their wrongdoings. If
corporations are vicariously liable for the torts of their servants, why
should not unions bear the same legal responsibility? This is not to
suggest that the same legal standards should be applicable. A union
could hardly be responsible for every act of its every member. Liability
should be limited in the manner indicated by Professor Laskin in the
Polymer arbitration case.8 The view expressed there is that only
important union officers should bind the union vicariously.
5Sherbaniuk- Actions By and Against Trade Unions (1958), 12 U.T.L.J
151 at 152-154. It involves the problem of whether suability is a matter of
substance or a mere technical matter. In Local Union No. 1562, United
Mine Workers of America v. Williams and Rees, 59 S.C.R. 240 the Supreme
Court of Canada was split on the estoppel question. In London Associatedfor Protection of Trade v. GreenZands Limited, [1916] 2 A.C. 15, the matter
of suability was regarded as a matter of substance; therefore the estoppel
argument would not apply.GTaff Vale Railway Company v. Amalgamated Society of Railway Serv.
ants, [1901] A.C. 426.
7 Tbid., at 431.8 Polymer Corp. Ltd. and Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Int'l. Union
Local 16-14 (1959), C.C.H., L.L.R. p. 16, 158.
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This immunity of trade unions inflicts the gravest injustice on
two classes: (i) third parties, (ii) union members seeking to sue
their unions. An example of this injustice is the recent Supreme
Court of Canada decision in Orchard v. Tunney.9 There the court
held that the trade union was not suable under Manitoba labour legis-
lation with the result that the wronged union member's only recourse
lay against the union officers personally.
In favour of the present immunity the trade unions argue that
society must accept the fact that the labour movement is sui generis.
Labour problems do not fit into the existing legal scheme or thinking.
In Ontario, this view is sustained by the fact that a Labour Court
was disbanded as unsatisfactory in its first year of operations. In
its stead an administrative body-the Labour Relations Board-was
set up to handle labour disputes. The Board is more flexible and
more knowledgeable in labour relations. The Board's purpose is not
merely to adjudicate but as well to promote harmony between em-
ployer and employee so that the common venture-the business-
will be a success. Any widening of the jurisdiction of the courts,
unions contend, will result in a corresponding weakening of the
Board's position. In the result the Board's unique ability to reconcile
rather than adjudicate, to seek the workable solutions rather than
deciding who is right and who is wrong, will be sacrificed. This would
throw the baby out with the bathwater and labour relations would
sink back into its former chaotic state.
Another union bugbear is their losing record in defending union
officers. They feel that this results from the unfair attitudes judges
show to trade unions. The unions contend that ordinary rules of law
are not designed to umpire the economic struggle waged between
capital and labour. Furthermore, the majority of legal actions against
union activities are for labour injunctions to prevent picketing and
they are so widely phrased now that the inclusion of the union would
have no practical significance.
At common law, a trade union was an unincorporated association
without legal status. Like the corporation it is a creature of statute
but unlike the corporation, legal personality has generally been the
result of implied rather than express statutory recognition. In the
Taff Vale Case the action was brought against a trade union registered
under the Trade Unions Acts of 1871 and 1876. At trial Farwell, J.
uttered the oft-repeated words which were approved by Lord Haldane
in the appeal to the House of Lords:
Now the legislation in giving a trade union the capacity to own property
and the capacity to act by agents has, without incorporating it, given it
two of the essential qualities of a corporation-essential I mean in respect
to liability for tort.10
By giving the union the powers and capacities which companies
had, the legislature also by implication intended to confer the same
9 [19571 S.C.R. 436.10 Supra, footnote 6 at 430.
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legal liabilities and duties. As a result of this judgment the Trade
Disputes Act of 1906 was passed. It amended the earlier labour
legislation and declared that no tort actions could be brought against
a trade union in any court. This illustrates, in general, the traditional
struggle by the courts to widen union liability and the legislature's
efforts to restrict it.
If the Canadian courts had wished to restrict Taff Vale to its
facts, they might have said that it was only intended to apply to
registered trade unions under the Trade Unions Acts of 1871 and 1876.
(It is arguable that it was this analogy with the registration of com-
panies which prompted Farwell, J.'s decision). Unlike Farwell, J.,
the Majority of the House of Lords preferred to regard suability as
a procedural question stemming from the fact of registration rather
than as a substantive question. Either view leads to the same result
if the trade union is registered. The only Canadian legislation calling
for registration of unions is the federal Trade Unions Act"1 which
calls for voluntary registration. Naturally very few unions have regis-
tered under it. There is the further question that its validity is doubt-
ful under our constitutional arrangements. 12
However, the Canadian courts have preferred the broad state-
ments made by Farwell, J. at the trial level in the Taff Vale Case.
This is best illustrated in the Therien Case'3 where Locke, J.
expressed the unanimous views of the Supreme Court of Canada in
holding that British Columbia labour legislation conferred legal per-
sonality on trade unions certified in that province. He said:
The granting of these rights, powers and immunities to these unincor-
porated associations or bodies is quite inconsistent with the idea that It
was not intended that the should be constituted legal entities .... 14
It is evident then that their legal status is entirely dependent
on the labour legislation in force in the particular jurisdiction. Unfor-
tunately, the courts are inclined to adopt these broad general state-
ments without examining closely the specific legislation involved.
The Therien decision was based on two British Columbia statutes.
One statute, the Labour Relations Act,15 is designed to encourage the
collective bargaining process and to achieve this end the Act confers
rights, powers, duties and responsibilities on the trade-union itself.
The Ontario Labour Relations Act has the same scheme and purpose.
Locke, J. decided that: "throughout the Act such organizations are
referred to as trade unions and thus treated as legal entities".'6
"1R.S.C. 1952, c. 67.
'
2 See Amalgamated Builders Council v. Herman, [19301 2 D.L.R. 513 at
520, Starr v. Chase, [1924] S.C.R. 495 at 507-508; Polakoff v. Winters Garment
Co., [1928] 2 D.L.R. 277 at 290.
i 3 International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Therien, [1960] S.C.R. 265.
14Ibid, at 277-78.
15 The Labour Relations Act, Stat. B.C. 1954, c. 17.
16Supra, footnote 13 at 276.
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The other British Columbia statute, is the 1902 Trade Unions Act.
The relevant sections are sections 2, 3 and 4.:7
Commenting on the effect of these sections, Locke, J. said:
"It will be seen that the British Columbia Act by its reference to trade-
unions as such, as well as to the servants and agents of such unions
restricting their liability in tort to the extent defined, recognized the fact
that a trade-union was an entity which might be enjoined or become
liable in damages for tort".s
This statute expressly limits union liability in three areas includ-
ing tort. The Supreme Court of Canada invoking the maxim expressio
unius, exclugio alterjus interpreted this as implying that otherwise
a trade-union was liable at common law. As this statute emphatically
speaks in terms of common law liability it is submitted that it is the
backbone of the Therien decision. Ontario does not have labour legis-
lation corresponding to the 1902 British Columbia Trade-unions Act.
Relying on the combined effect of these statutes, Locke, J. declared:
17Trade Unions Act, R.S.B.C. 1948, c. 342. It is referred to as the 1902
British Columbia Trade-unions Act to distinguish it from 1959 British Colum-
bia Trade-unions Act which substantially amended the 1902 Act.
S. 2. No trade-union nor any association of workmen or employees in
the province, nor the trustees of any such trade-union or association in their
representative capacity shall be liable in damages for any wrongful act of
commission or omission in connection with any strike, lockout, or trade orlabour dispute, unless the members of such trade-union or association, or its
council, committee, or other governing body, acting within the authority orjurisdiction given such council, committee or other governing body by rules,
regulations, or directions of such trade-union or association, or the resolu-
tions or directions of its members resident in the locality or a majority
thereof, have authorized or have been a concurring party in such a wrongful
act
3. No such trade-union or association shall be enjoined nor shall any
officers, member, agent; or servant of such trade-union or association or any
other person be enjoined, nor shall it or its funds or any such officer, member,
agent, servant or other person be made liable in damages for communicating
to any workman, artisan, labourer, employee, or person facts respecting
employment or hiring by or with any employer, producer, or consumer or
distributor of the products of labour or the purchase of such products, orfor persuading or endeavouring to persuade by fair or reasonable argument,
without unlawful threats, intimidation, or other unlawful acts, such last
named workman, artisan labourer, employee or person, at the expiration
of any existing contract, not to renew the same with or to refuse to become
the employee or customer of any such employer, producer, consumer, or
distributor of the products of labour.
4. No such trade-union or association, or its officer, member, agent, or
servant, or other person, shall be enjoined or liable in damages, nor shall its
funds be liable in damages for publishing information with regard to a strike
or a lockout or proposed or expected strike or lockout, or other labour griev-
ance or trouble, or for warning workmen, artisans, labourers, or employees
or other persons against seeking, or urging workmen, artisans, labourers,
employees, or other persons not to seek, employment in the locality affected
by such strike, lockout, labour grievance or trouble, or from purchasing,
buying or consuming products produced, or distributed by the employer of
labour party to such strike, lockout, labour grievance or trouble, during its
continuance.1
. Supra, footnote 13, at 275.
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Were it not for the provisions of the Trade-unions Act and the Industrial
Relations Actl9 . . . [the union] would not be an entity which could be
sued by name ... 20
The issue was squarely faced in Ontario in the Nipissing Hotel
Case. There Spence, J. simply applied the reasoning of the Therien
case without making the effort to examine thoroughly and correlate
the comparitive statutory basis for finding legal personality in an
Ontario trade-union:
It being admitted, therefore, that the Labour Relations Act of Ontario
R.S.O. 1960, c. 202 being in para materia with the British Columbia
statutes considered in the last three cited cases, it would appear that a
labour union certified under the provisions of the Ontario statute is ajuristic person and can sue or be sued, subject however, to the provisions
of The Rights of Labour Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 354, s. 3(2) ...
The Rights of Labour Act 22 in s. 3 (2) provides that:
A trade union shall not be made a party to any action in any court
unless it may be so made a party irrespective of any of the provisions
of this Act or the Labour Relations Act.
Was Spence, J. correct in assuming that the Therien reasoning
applied to Ontario except for the existence of the Rights of Labour
Act.
It is submitted that in Ontario a trade union is not a suable
entity regardless of the effect of s. 3 (2) of The Rights of Labour Act.
This is submitted because it is possible that s. 3(2) might not have
the effect that Spence, J. attributed to it in Nipissing Hotel. As well,
since this is provincial legislation, even if s. 3(2) does negate the
inference of legal personality, it can have no effect on the status of
trade unions certified under the federal Industrial Relations and Dis-
putes Investigation Act.23
In order to test the validity of Spence, J.'s argument that a trade
is a legal entity subject to s. 3(2) of the Rights of Labour Act, it
is helpful to answer the following questions:
(1) Are two Acts necessary, as in Therien, or is the Ontario
Labour Relations Act standing alone sufficient to create legal per-
sonality?
(2) If the British Columbia Labour Relations Act alone would
have been sufficient in Therien was Spence, J. correct in assuming
that the Ontario Labour Relations Act was in para materia with it?
(3) If one Act (The Ontario Labour Relations Act) is not suffi-
cient, is it arguable that in fact Ontario has two Acts which have
the cumulative effect of the two British Columbia statutes?
19The Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act, Stat. B.C. 1947, c. 44
has been repealed by The Labour Relations Act. They are in para materia.
Locke, J. refers to the repealed statute because it was in effect at the time
that the British Columbia cases, to which he was referring, were decided.
20 Supra footnote 13, at 277.
21 Supra footnote 1 at 172.
22 R.S.O. 1960, c. 354.
23 R.S.C. 1952, c. 152.
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ARE TWO ACTS NECESSARY?
The Therien case makes it clear that in fact and in law it was
based on the combined effect of the two British Columbia statutes,
especially the effect of the 1902 Trade Unions Act. One ground for
this submission is Locke, J.'s statement in the Therien Case repro-
duced earlier.24
Furthermore in Therien, Locke, J. distinguished the earlier
Supreme Court of Canada decision of Orchard v. Tunney25 on the
basis that: ". . . there was no such statute in force in the Province
of Manitoba when the cause of action arose in the Orchard Case.' 26
He was referring to the 1902 British Columbia Trade-unions Act and
noted that there was only one labour statute in existence in Manitoba,
viz.: the Labour Relations Act.2 Admittedly, Locke, J. inferred legal
status from each of the Acts2s but it is submitted that his argument
makes it clear that the ratio of the case is founded on the combined
effect of both statutes.
Immediately after Therien two cases on the precise effect of a
single statute, the Labour Relations Act,2 9 arose in the Manitoba
courts. In the first case,3 0 Monnin, J. reversed his own earlier deci-
sion,31 held that Therien had re-opened the question, and found that
the union was a suable entity. He reasoned that the Manitoba and
British Columbia Labour Relations Acts were in para materia. In his
opinion the 1902 B.C. Trade-unions Act was not necessary to support
the inference of legal personality made in Therien. The Labour Rela-
tions Act standing alone was sufficient to support such an inference.
As a result he said: "it is not necessary that both statutes should
co-exist".32
In the following year the same question was posed in the same
court before Williams, C.J.Q.B.33. He disagreed with Monnin, J.
Instead he followed the line of pre-Therien decisions to the effect that
if the legislature intends to impose legal personality on a union, this
must be done in clear and unequivocal terms and not by vague impli-
cations. But Williams, C.J.Q.B. examined the particular section of
the Manitoba Labour Relations Act which governed legal liability:
24 Supra, footnote 20.
25 Supra, footnote 9.
26 Ibid., at 275.
27 R.S.M. 1954, c. 132. The Act has since been reversed see infra footnote48.
28 The Labour Relations Act, Stat. B.C. 1954, c. 17. Trade Unions Act,
R.S:B.C 1948, c. 342.29 Supra, footnote 27.
30 Dusessoys Supremarkets St. James Ltd. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local
882 (1961), 34 W.W.R. 577; 30 D.L.R. (2d) 5.
31 Nabess & Lynn Lake Base Metal Workers Federal Union No. 292 v.
Sherritt Gordon Mines Ltd. (1959), 67 Man. R. 22.
32 Supra, footnote 30 at 598-99.
33 Re Bakery & Confectionery Workers International Union of America
Local 889, Winnipeg, and Brothers Bakery Ltd., 37 W.W.R. 413.
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S. 46(1)-A prosecution for an offence under this Act may be brought
against.., a trade union and in the name of the... union, and for the
purpose of the prosecution a trade union . . .shall be deemed a person.
Applying the "exclusio unius.. ." maxim, the Chief Justice reasoned
that since legal status is restricted to prosecution for particular
offences committed under the Act, by implication, then, a trade-union
will not have legal status for any other purpose.
Of these two conflicting Manitoba decisions, it is submitted that
the latter decision is to be preferred. Rather than simply assuming
that British Columbia and Manitoba legislation is in para materia,
Williams, C.J.Q.B. chose to examine the Manitoba legislation in detail.
In Ontario, three sections in the Labour Relations Act are
germane:
s. 72-A prosecution for an offence under this Act may be instituted
against a trade union ... in the name of the union.
s. 73-Proceedings to enforce a determination of the Board under s. 65, a
decision of an arbitrator . . . may be instituted in the Supreme Court
by or against a trade union . . in the name of the trade union ...
s. 74(2)-An application for consent to institute a prosecution for an
offence under this Act may be made inter alia by a trade union and, If
the consent is given by the Board, the information may be laid inter alia
by any officer, official or member of the trade union.
Section 72 corresponds quite closely with s. 46 (1) of the Manitoba
legislation. The major difference is that the Ontario section omits
the last few words- ". . that for the purpose the trade union shall
be deemed a person.. .". If any importance is to be attached to this
omission, it is that it implies that trade unions are not generally
cloaked with legal status. The legislature deliberately avoids the
statement that a union is to be equated with a natural person. The
other variance is that section 72 only refers to proceedings against a
trade union. Section 74(2) covers prosecutions brought by a trade
union. By focusing on the method of adducing evidence this section
supports the contention that it is procedural rather than a substantive
declaration of legal status.
Section 73 permits specific proceedings to be instituted in the
Supreme Court of Ontario by or against trade unions viz.--enforce-
ment of orders made by the Board under s. 65, and by arbitrators.
[The orders often involve compensation awards and directives order-
ing a company to rehire an employee and reimburse him for lost
wages.] This, and the fact that the proceedings involve private parties
demonstrates a close affinity to civil proceedings. A reasonable inter-
pretation of the section would indicate that this is the only type
of civil proceeding that the legislature intended to be brought against
trade unions. Consequently, there is less reason to infer legal person-
ality under the Ontario legislation than under the Manitoba legislation
which only refers to prosecutions.
In view of the close similarity between the Manitoba and Ontario
legislation, it is surprising that Spence, J. did not mention either of
the post-Therien Manitoba decisions.
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ARE THE BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ONTARIO LABOUR RELA-
TIONS ACT IN PARA MATERIA?
Even more surprising is the fact that Spence, J. could arrive
at the conclusion that the British Columbia and Ontario Labour
Relations Acts were in para materia. Admittedly the general purpose
is the same-to establish a workable scheme for carrying out the
collective bargaining process. For this purpose, the union as one of
the two bargaining parties is by necessity designated a separate entity
from the general body of employees. But this should not be construed
as indicating it is a suable entity. A separate entity for the purposes
of the collective bargaining process and a legal entity in the courts
of common law are two entirely different breeds of cat.
Under the British Columbia Labour Relations Act the only section
touching on legal liability is s. 60-"Every trade union.., who does
something prohibited by this Act... is guilty of an offence and...
is liable on summary conviction ... ".
The section describes the procedure for penalizing trade unions
which are in breach of the Act. It is immediately evident that there
is an antithetical approach taken by the two statutes. Whereas the
Ontario section states that in certain circumstances proceedings may
be brought by or against a trade union in the name of the union,
the British Columbia section simply states that every trade union
which is guilty of an offence is liable. The British Columbia section
pre-supposes the right to bring an action against trade unions. This
is the crucial distinction between British Columbia legislation on the
one hand and Ontario, Manitoba and federal legislation on the other.
This difference in attitude by the British Columbia legislature has
been evident since the first labour legislation was passed in that
province.34
This analysis has particular importance to federal trade unions
certified under the Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation
Act.35 Like the provincial Labour Relations Acts, it is designated to
promote industrial harmony by the collective bargaining process. The
section which expressly defines legal liability is s. 45(1) and its
34Carrothers, The British Columbia Trade-Unions Act, 1959 (1960), 38
Can. Bar Rev. 295 at p. 318. Prof. Carrothers explains the curious history of
British Columbia labour legislation. In the same year that Taff Vale wasdecided, the British Columbia courts erroneously held that a trade union
was a suable entity at common law (Rossland Miner's case). The court
failed to appreciate that Farwell, J.'s decision was based on a statute. There
was no British Columbia labour legislation in existence at that time. On
the assumption that the RossZand Miner's case was correct in law the legisla-
tion enacted the 1902 Trade-Unions Act to relieve unions from liability,
not to impose liability. Ironically, by referring to trade unions as such, andby relieving them from specific liabilities, the Supreme Court of Canada in
Therien was able to infer that except for the enunciated exemptions a trade
union is a suable entitly in the British Columbia courts. To Quote Carrothers(p. 320): "The result appears to be a macabre illustration of the proposition
that communis error facit jus."35 S upra, footnote 23.
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wording is the same as s. 46 (1) of the Manitoba Act. As far as the
relevant case law is concerned-as well as the Manitoba cases, which
have already been referred to, there is a pre-Therien decision36 of the
Ontario courts on the effect of s. 45(1) of the Federal Act. Unlike
Spence, J. in the Nipissing Hotel case, Barlow J. in the C.S.U. case 37
examined the pertinent section in detail and held that any legal
personality was strictly limited to the express purposes of the act
viz. prosecutions for offences under the Act. This is precisely the
approach taken by Williams, C.J.Q.B.
It is possible that the opposing lines of authorities can be ex-
plained by the different role played by the union in the cases. In
Therien, Nipissing Hotel and Dusessoy's Supermarkets3 the union
was the defendant in the action, whereas, in the C.S.U. case and
Brothers Bakery3 9 the union was the plaintiff in the action. It is sub-
mitted that this is not a valid distinction. There is no statutory basis
for it and not one of the judgments has distinguished the union's role
as either plaintiff or defendant.
In summary, it is submitted that where there is only one Act in
existence, which is framed in the style of the Manitoba, Ontario, or
federal labour Acts, such legislation cannot confer legal personality
on a trade union.
This, we submit, should have been the first proposition in the
Nipissing Hotel case. Only afterwards should Spence, J. have dwelt
on the effect of s. 3 (2) of the Rights of Labour Act as an alternate
ground for the decision.
DOES ONTARIO HAVE TWO ACTS?
In reference solely to Ontario trade unions, it has been suggested
that legal status is acquired by the combined effect of two Acts--the
Labour Relations Act and the Rights of Labour Act. The argument
is that they have the same cumulative effect as the two British
Columbia statutes in the Therien case. For this purpose, it is assumed,
first, that both Labour Relations Acts are in para materia, and,
secondly, that the opening words of s. 3(2) of The Rights of Labour
Act: "A trade union shall not be made a party to any action in any
court unless.. .' have the same consequence as sections 2, 3 and 4
of the 1902 British Columbia Trade-unions Acts. That consequence,
it is asserted, is that outside of the exception, a trade union is a legal
entity.
The difficulty with relying on s. 3(2) to establish legal person-
ality is that the section in toto is judicially interpreted as destroying
any right to sue or be sued which might have existed as a result of
36 Canadian Seamen's Union v. Canada Labour Relations Board, (1951J
2 D.L.R. 356.
37 Ibid.3 8 Supra, footnote 30.
3 9 Supra, footnote 33.
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the operation of one or both of these Acts. To have the same section
both create legal status and destroy it is patently absurd. In fact, a
better interpretation of the opening words of s. 3(2) is that the
legislature is expressing its uncertainty about the present state of
the law, and in order to avoid Therien-type decisions, it is making it
explicit that neither Act can be relied on to create legal personality.
Finally, assuming that Spence, J. was correct in finding that
the Labour Relations Act did confer legal personality at common law
on a trade union, does s. 3(2) destroy it? According to Spence, J.,
by specifically prohibiting any reference to either Act in ascertaining
whether it is a legal entity, s. 3(2) has destroyed the very foundation
upon which legal personality has traditionally been decided.
Another interesting theory40 is that the intention of the legis-
lature in passing s. 3(2) was not to deny that trade unions were suable
entities, but to protect the jurisdiction of the Ontario Labour Relations
Board by preventing the courts from entertaining proceedings which
expressly fell to the Board under the Labour Relations Act. Under
this theory, the traditional common law actions in tort and contract
can still be brought against trade unions in the courts of law.
The best way to refute this theory is to trace the legislative
history of s. 3(2). The first comprehensive labour legislation in
Ontario was the Collective Bargaining Act, 1943.4' It was not as
detailed as successor legislation42 but it did establish fundamental
rules relating to the collective bargaining process and a Labour Court
to administer the Act. It contained a s. 3 (2) which was essentially
the same as the present s. 3 (2) of the Rights of Labour Act. As well,
under s. 15 (1) the Act specified that: "The court shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to examine into, hear and determine all matters and
questions arising under this Act." It is clear that since s. 15(1)
expressly protected the Labour Court's exclusive jurisdiction, there
was no point in implying that s. 3 (2) served the same purpose. During
World War IT the Ontario labour legislation underwent a curious
history. In 1944, the federal government under its general emergency
powers, assumed authority in labour relations matters and so the
Collective Bargaining Act was repealed by the Labour Relations
Board Act, 1944.4 3 The effect of this Act was to authorize the appli-
cation of the federal Wartime Labour Relations Regulations (passed
under the War Measures Act) to labour relations in Ontario. At the
same time, the Labour Court was replaced by the Labour Relations
Board. Only one section of the 1943 legislation was preserved-s. 3,
and it was transferred to and became the core of The Rights of
Labour Act, 1944.44
40A. C. Crysler, Actions By or Against Trade Unions in Ontario (1961),
39 Can. Bar. Rev. 30 at 3940.41 Stat. Ont. 1943, c. 4.42The Labour Relations Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 202, as amended by 1961-62.
c. 68.43 Stat. Ont. 1944, c. 29.44 Stat. Ont. 1944, c. 54.
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Thus, for four years, s. 3 was our only meaningful provincial
labour legislation. In 1948 the federal government vacated the pro-
vincial labour relations field and the Ontario Legislature hurriedly
passed the Labour Relations Act, 1948. 45 This Act had nothing to
say about the rights and duties of labour and management in the
collective bargaining system. It was primarily intended to re-define
the powers of the Labour Relations Board. Therefore, it is not very
surprising that no mention was made of the Board's exclusive juris-
diction to determine matters arising under this Act. Section 4 in
outlining certain powers of the Board stated that the Board "shall
decided such questions and.., its decision shall be final and binding."
Section 5 stated that the decisions of the Board should not be ques-
tioned or reviewed by the courts. There was nothing as emphatic as
the original section 15.
More comprehensive legislation was enacted in the Labour Rela-
tions Act, 1950.46 Sections 68 and 69 (now 79 and 80)47 reproduced
the original section 15 of 1943, together with sections 4 and 5 of the
1948 statute. Therefore, once again it is clear that section 79 protects
the Board's exclusive jurisdiction while s. 3(2) is designed to meet
the broader problem raised by the Theren case.
In the light of the preceding examination it is evident that the
provincial and federal legislation defining trade union liability is in
an unsatisfactory state. It is submitted that the sensible approach is
that taken by Williams, C.J.Q.B. If the legislature intends to displace
the common law immunity enjoyed by trade unions it ought to do this
by clear and unequivocal legislation. This submission is supported by
the fact that both British Columbia and Manitoba have, since Therien
and the post-Therien decisions discussed earlier, enacted legislation 4S
which clearly outlines the liability of trade unions in the courts of
law.
It is scandalous that the legal status of so basic an institution in
our society-the trade union-has not been settled.
45 Stat. Ont. 1948, c. 51.
46 Stat. Ont. 1950, c. 34.
47 Supra footnote 42.
48 The Manitoba Labour Relations Act 1962, c. 35 adds the following
section:
46A(1) Any employers' organization, trade union, employer, employee, or
person who-(a) does, or authorizes, or aids or abets the doing of anything prohibited
under this Act; or(b) fails to do anything required to be done under this Act; or(c) authorizes, or aids or abets in the failure to do anything required
to be done under this Act:
is liable for general or special damages, or both, to anyone who is injured or
suffers damage by the act or failure.(2) A party to a collective agreement . . . who or which is in breach
thereof, is liable for general or special damages, or both, and may be sued
[Footnote continued on page 89.1
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